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Dirksen v. Department of Health and
Human Services,
-_F.2d__, No. 85-2771, 86 D.A.R.
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blueprint for committing the crime or
avoiding detection. Since that was not
the case here, Judge Ferguson concluded
that the guidelines should be discosed.
CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT

Medicare Payment Guidelines
Exempt from FOIA.

Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa v.
32nd\Distrikt Agricultural Association,

Guidelines used by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) for auditing and paying Medicare
claims are exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act.
Plaintiff Dirksen, a doctor, sought
disclosure of the "Medicare Policy
Guidelines" used by HHS and its contractors for processing Medicare claims.
The guidelines are used to determine
which claims will be paid without further
review, which are immediately denied,
and which are held for further study.
Dirksen sought the guidelines to assist
him in completing Medicare reimbursement forms. The request was denied by
HHS, and the decision affirmed by the
district court.
On appeal, Judges Sneed and Farris
upheld the government's refusal to
disclose the guidelines. The Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) exempts "matters that are...related solely to the
internal rules and practices of the
agency." Although the Supreme Court
has held that the exception is to be narrowly construed, it does apply to law
enforcement materials where disclosure
"may risk circumvention of agency regulations." The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between law enforcement
methods, which are exempt, and administrative materials, which might define
"secret" crimes and so are subject to
disclosure. The court found that the
Medicare rules for payment might conceivably be circumvented by physicians
who would fashion their claims to fit the
"automatically grant" category and so
defeat the purpose of the guidelines.
Judge Ferguson, in a vigorous dissent,
would have required disclosure. He
noted the broad purpose of the FOIA in
favoring disclosure, and that the narrowness of the exception for internal
materials precludes its application here.
The exception actually draws a distinction between internal materials of a
purely trivial nature, and those of public
interest. When the latter are involved,
the exception should only be used where
the materials are truly used for law
enforcement purposes and disclosures
would provide potential criminals with a

.- __Cal. 3d_, No. L.A. 32144,
86 D.A.R. 3917 (Dec. 1, 1986).
Time to Challenge EIR Tolled Until
Unannounced Changes Discovered.
The California Supreme Court held
that changes in a planned stadium after
an environmental impact report (EIR)
was filed and approved, but not announced or discovered by the affected
neighborhood until after the time had
run for suit, could still be challenged.
The time for filing suit for noncompliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) did not accrue
until the changes were discovered.
CEQA requires that an EIR be filed
by a public agency for any project that
will have a significant impact on the
environment. A subsequent or supplemental EIR is required for any substantial changes in the project. Failure to file
the EIR or supplemental EIR must be
challenged within 180 days after the project is commenced.
In 1977 the defendant, which maintains the Orange County Fairgrounds,
proposed improvements to the grounds,
including a theater. An EIR was filed
and approved after hearing. Construction began in February 1983 and the first
concert was held on July 27, 1983. The
plaintiffs alleged that only then did they
discover substantial changes in the original plan, including increased seating
from 5,000 to 7,000; enlargement of the
site from six to ten acres; a repositioning
of the amphitheater such that it faced
into rather than away from the residential area; and failure to implement noise
mitigation measures. Plaintiffs, residents
of the area, filed suit on January 20,
1984. Upon stipulation, the Orange
County Superior Court sustained a
demurrer without leave to amend and
dismissed the complaint, on the basis
that the complaint was filed after the
180-day period.
The Supreme Court, Justices Reynoso, Bird, Broussard and Grodin, reversed. After noting the importance of
public notice and active participation in
the environmental review process, the
court took as granted two propositions:

that the changes were substantial enough
to require a subsequent EIR, and that
the case was filed outside the 180-day
period.
The court held that failure to file any
public notice of the proposed changes, as
required by CEQA, effectively prevented
the residents from having the information needed to challenge the failure to
the file a subsequent EIR. In brief, the
agency cannot use its own failure to
inform the public as the basis for asserting that the public was too late to challenge the failure to notify the public
through an EIR.
The court did note that commencement of a project acts as constructive
notice of intent, so that normally the
time to challenge the failure to file any
EIR will begin to run upon commencement of construction. However, where
an EIR has been filed and accepted,
commencement of construction will only
act as constructive notice of intent to
build the project as described. Thus,
the time to file an action "challenging
the agency's noncompliance with CEQA
may be filed within 180 days of the time
the plaintiff knew or reasonably should
have known that the project under way
differs substantially from the one described in the EIR."
Justices Mosk, Lucas, and Panelli dissented. Although agreeing with the
general holding as quoted above, they
disputed the reading of the facts in the
case. In brief, they found it untenable
that plaintiffs did not learn of the
changes until the date of the first concert. Rather, given their proximity to the
site, they must have been aware of at
least the changes in the site size and
orientation well before that date. Therefore, their complaint, filed on the 180th
day after the first concert, was untimely
even under the late discovery rule.
CBS, Inc. v. Block
___Cal. 3d__, No. L.A. 32029,
86 D.A.R. 3505 (Oct. 9, 1986).
Concealed Gun Records Available
Under Public Records Act.
The California Supreme Court has
held that applications and licenses for
concealed weapons must be disclosed
under the California Public Records Act
(PRA).
In July 1983, CBS filed a request
under the PRA for applications for concealed weapons and permits granted by
the Los Angeles Coufity Sheriff. The
information was sought in connection
with an investigation into whether public
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officials were granting permits to campaign contributors. The request was
refused. The trial court required disclosure of the licenses, with the addresses
deleted. Both sides appealed.
The Supreme Court, Justices Bird,
Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, and McCloskey (by designation), -granted full
disclosure of all records, and allowed
copying of the applications. The court
noted the general policy in favor of full
disclosure of all governmental records,
with certain narrowly-drawn exceptions.
Protecting personal privacy is an interest
that will be afforded consideration in
permitting an exception. However, the
only statutory exception applicable here
is the "catchall" exception in the PRA,
which applies if the agency can demonstrate that "on the facts of a particular
case the public interest served by not
making the records public clearly outweighs the public interest served by
disclosure of the record."
The court dismissed the two rationales supplies by the defendent for concealing the records. The court called the
potential threat to or vulnerability of the
licenees "conjectural at best." As one
observer noted, a potential criminal is
likely to be interested in knowing who
carries concealed weapons for reasons of
avoidance, not stalking. The potential
discouragement of applicants was also
held to be "unpersuasive" since the public's right to know cannot be circumscribed because disclosure might cause
those who prefer secrecy to violate
the law by carrying a weapon without
a license.
The court also distinguished earlier
cases involving police records, where
privacy interests were held to outweigh
disclosure interests. Those cases involved
disclosure of police records of those who
associate with organized crime figures
and of intelligence dossiers collected on
professors and students. In those cases,
the private individuals had a constitutional right to privacy in their affairs and
associations, and the information might
be damaging without any certainty of
accuracy or voluntariness of disclosure.
Applicants for concealed weapon permits do not acquire any stigma from the
records of the application or license,
voluntarily disclose the information, and
certify it to be true.
The court did, however, allow deletion
of any material that might disclose key
information about the applicant's lives
that might indicate times or places of
attack or vulnerability, and any information of a highly personal nature, such as
medical or psychological history.
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Justices Mosk and Panelli dissented,
and adopted verbatim much of the opinion of the court of appeal which affirmed
the trial court judgment, largely on the
ground that there was a substantial
increased risk to the applicants if their
names were disclosed.
CALIFORNIA
COURTS OF APPEAL
McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co.,
-Cal. App. 3d, 86 D.A.R. 3811,
5th Dist., No. 97464 (Nov. 5, 1986).
No 'Exhaustion' Requirement Where
Administrative Remedy Cumulative
to Common Law Remedies.
Although a plaintiff must normally
exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to judicial process, exhaustion
is not required where the administrative
remedy is cumulative or parallel to a
common law remedy that preexists the
administrative process.
Plaintiff, an olive grower, filed suit
against defendant, an olive processor.
The amended complaint was a class
action for breach of contract, fraud,
conversion, and breach of good faith and
fair dealing. He sought compensatory
and punitive damages. Defendant moved
for and was granted summary judgment
on the grounds that statutory provisions
giving the Director of the Bureau of
Marketing Enforcement (Director)
power to investigate complaint by producers against processors for failure to
make contract payments provide an
administrative remedy which must be
exhausted before filing suit. His/her
enforcement powers do not include
awarding damages-compensatory or
punitive-on behalf of an individual;
but the Director may impose conditions
on the retention of the processor's
license, including restitution to the complaining producer.
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, Justices Azenedo, Hanson, and
Best, held that summary judgment was
improperly granted. The court first
addressed whether there was an administrative remedy and if so, whether it
could provide adequate relief to plaintiff.
That the Director's powers were essentially punitive in nature, rather than
compensatory to the aggrieved individual, was held to be incorrect, in that
the Director was empowered to effect a
resolution of the dispute that would
encompass compensation to the complainant. Although in other cases of
enforcement the powers granted the
agency are prospective in nature, here
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retroactive relief to the specific individual could be awarded. Thus plaintiff did
have an administrative remedy that was
both capable of exhaustion and capable
of providing him the relief he sought.
However, the court also held that the
remedy was not exclusive, and therefore
the exhaustion doctrine's jurisdictional
preclusion of judicial action did not
apply. In making this finding, the court
relied heavily on the fact that a relevant
statutory provision states that the procedures therein are "in addition to other
rights, remedies and penalties which are
provided by law...." In particular, the
court found that the administrative procedure was not intended to codify or
provide for enforcement of a preexisting
common law right, and therefore was
not exclusive. In addition, policy
reasons for exhaustion-deference to
agency expertise, need for factual development, capacity of the agency to
resolve the matter without judicial involvement, protection of agency processes,
and conservation of judicial resourcesdid not apply.
Hothem v. San Francisco
-Cal. App. 3d-__ 86 D.A.R. 3575,
1st Dist., Div. 1, No. A025359
(Oct. 22, 1986).
Administrative Mandate Requires
Review of Entire Record with Burden
On Agency to Create Record and
Petitionerto ProduceIt.
In a dispute with San Francisco over
the designation of his hotel, petitioner
received an adverse ruling in an administrative hearing. He sought a writ of
mandate under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5. In the trial court, petitioner did not produce the oral proceedings (which may not have been recorded
or transcribed), nor any of the documents presented. Instead he relied
solely on three of his own declarations
which supported his position. The writ
was denied.
The First District Court of Appeal,
Justices Elkington, Racanelli, and
Holmdahl, reversed and remanded. The
court held that the record in the trial
court was not sufficient to determine the
key issue: whether, looking at the whole
administrative record, the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. The
petitioner bears sole responsibility for
producing the record, and failure to do
so merits automatic denial of the writ.
An "adequate" record will not suffice,
nor is the respondent responsibe for
producing the record for the trial court.
However, the agency must make an
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entire, usable record available to the
petitioner. Failure to do so requires
setting aside the findings. Because the
availability and comprehensiveness of
the record was in dispute, the matter
was remanded for further proceedings
on the point.
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